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[887] 
An “SDVCJ Fix”—Paths Forward in Tribal 
Domestic Violence Jurisdiction 
JOSHUA B. GURNEY† 
Domestic violence has riddled the indigenous communities of the United States for decades. 
Within this problem lies another—non-Indians perpetrate crimes of domestic violence against 
Indian women at disproportionately high rates. Exacerbating this issue is the complicated web of 
criminal jurisdiction split between federal, state, and tribal governments. To ostensibly solve the 
problem, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013. The Act 
contained an important provision that returned criminal jurisdiction to tribes, called “Special 
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction.” 
Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction, by most accounts, has been a resounding 
success. But it suffers from critical limitations, namely, requirements that make its implementation 
impossible for most tribes. This Note proposes a solution to these limitations that would allow all 
tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic violence: an SDVCJ fix. By 
examining Supreme Court precedent and applying a more consistent constitutional analysis, this 
Note advances a theory by which tribes could prosecute non-Indian defendants notwithstanding 
the inability to provide all facets of due process.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Few stories in American history are as appalling as our government’s 
protracted mistreatment of the indigenous peoples of the United States. By way 
of “manifest destiny,” subjugation, and centuries of progressive erosion of tribal 
sovereignty at the hands of our government and its highest court, our country’s 
collective ambition has left in its wake a trail of hardship and pain.1 Today, the 
scores of tribal nations scattered across our country face some of the most 
challenging economic and educational conditions in America.2 It was in this 
environment that domestic violence began—and still continues—to proliferate 
in native communities.3 To make matters worse, the very laws of the United 
States encouraged, rather than hindered, the perpetration of domestic violence 
 
 1. See James Anaya (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Report on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47, at 10–13 (July 6, 2012); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
543, 585 (1823) (holding the “exclusive power to extinguish” the “Indian right of occupancy” resided in the U.S. 
government). 
 2. Jens Manuel Krogstad, One-in-Four Native American and Alaska Natives Are Living in Poverty, PEW 
RES. CTR. (June 13, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/13/1-in-4-native-americans-and-
alaska-natives-are-living-in-poverty. 
 3. See Anaya, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
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against native women by non-Indian men.4 For nearly forty years, tribes were 
completely unable to hold criminally accountable any non-Indian offenders who 
committed acts of domestic violence against Indian people, owing to our own 
Supreme Court.5  
Fortunately, the status quo did not go unchallenged. By the beginning of 
this past decade, a chorus of outrage from tribal leaders and victims of domestic 
violence finally convinced Congress to take action.6 On March 7, 2013, 
Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 
(VAWA 2013) giving hope to tribes which, for so long, had been unable to 
adequately protect their people against domestic violence.7 This Act contained 
a unique provision, called “special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction” 
(SDVCJ), which recognized the inherent power of a tribe to exercise criminal 
authority over all people who commit crimes of domestic violence against their 
people and on their lands.8 Now set to expire, a new VAWA is once again 
moving towards reauthorization in Congress.9 Soon SDVCJ may be a thing of 
the past, substituted for a retooled “special tribal criminal jurisdiction,” with new 
attendant powers (discussed in more depth infra Part II).10 
This Note identifies some of the critical weaknesses of VAWA 2013—
weaknesses not corrected in current reauthorization bills—and proposes a novel, 
constitutionally acceptable expansion of tribal jurisdiction over non-native 
perpetrators of domestic violence. It argues for new expansions of VAWA and 
the Indian Civil Rights Act that allow all tribes to criminally prosecute and 
imprison non-Indian defendants who commit crimes of domestic violence 
against tribal members, have sufficient ties to the victim, and do not successfully 
complete tribal programs initially offered to the defendant as an alternative to 
incarceration. This Note proposes that making this expansion available to all 
tribes, or most tribes, is necessary, even though many tribes will not be able to 
offer non-Indian defendants due process completely consistent with the Indian 
Civil Rights Act and the United States Constitution.  
 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (discussed infra Part I). 
 6. See Sari Horwitz, Arizona Tribe Set to Prosecute First Non-Indian Under a New Law, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/arizona-tribe-set-to-prosecute-first-non-indian-
under-a-new-law/2014/04/18/127a202a-bf20-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html?utm_term=.1f4dea3c7942. 
 7. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54. 
 8. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. I 2013).  
 9. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act 2018, H.R. 6545, 115th Cong. (2018); Sarah D. Wire, 
Landmark Violence Against Women Act May Expire While Congress Tends to Other Business, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
13, 2018, 1:25 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-violence-against-women-expire-20180913-
story.html; cf. Rebecca Nagle, What the Violence Against Women Act Could Do in Indian Country—and One 
Major Flaw, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-what-the-
violence-against-women-act-could-do-in-indian-country-and-one-major-flaw (“If VAWA lapses, it will not 
change any statutes in the existing law or even necessarily cut funding. During the last reauthorization fight, for 
example, VAWA expired for 500 days, and yet program funding continued. But whether or not the bill is 
reauthorized, it still must go through the appropriations process, in which Congress allocates the necessary 
money.”). 
 10. See H.R. 6545 § 906. 
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This Note seeks to strike a balance between the ideal and the feasible, 
especially given the potential for decades of a conservative majority on the 
Supreme Court that could ultimately decide the constitutionality of a retooled 
VAWA.11 Issues of tribal sovereignty and self-determination will always 
underlie the relationships between tribal and state and federal governments.12 
This Note recognizes the importance of those issues but focuses primarily on the 
problem unique to the context of SDVCJ—the unacceptably high rates of 
domestic violence. This Note’s thesis thus focuses on how the laws of the United 
States can best serve tribal victims13 of domestic violence, perpetrated by non-
natives on Indian lands.  
The Introduction and Part I provide contextual information about domestic 
violence generally, the prevalence of domestic violence in Indian country, and 
the historical development of criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands, all of which 
set the stage prior to the enactment of VAWA 2013. Part II reviews the 
implementation of SDVCJ and discusses current developments and criticisms. 
Finally, Part III offers a path forward by arguing for a constitutionally consistent 
expansion of SDVCJ based on Supreme Court precedent and the dire need to 
address the situation in Indian country. 
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
According to André B. Rosay’s National Intimate Partner and Sexual 
Violence Survey, nearly forty percent of American Indian and Alaska Native 
women reported experiencing at least one form of domestic violence in 2015.14 
Native women are among the most susceptible to violence of any ethnic group 
 
 11. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Conservatives in Charge, the Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-2017-term-
moved-right.html. However, the confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch—who previously served on the Tenth 
Circuit—brings the Supreme Court significant federal Indian law experience and perhaps a fresh perspective. 
See John Dossett, Justice Gorsuch and Federal Indian Law, 43 HUM. RTS. 7, 8 (2017) (“Justice Gorsuch has 
significantly more experience with Indian law cases than other recent Supreme Court nominees. His opinions 
have commonly recognized tribes as sovereign governments and have addressed issues such as state police 
incursion onto tribal lands, sovereign immunity, religious freedom, accounting for trust funds, exhaustion of 
tribal remedies, and Indian Country criminal jurisdiction.”). 
 12. For a discussion of the implications of SDVCJ on tribal sovereignty, see generally Angela R. Riley, 
Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564 (2016); Catherine M. Redlingshafer, Note, 
An Avoidable Conundrum: How American Indian Legislation Unnecessarily Forces Tribal Governments to 
Choose Between Cultural Preservation and Women’s Vindication, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393 (2017). 
 13. This Note will use the phrases “victim” and “survivor” interchangeably. 
 14. ANDRÉ B. ROSAY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN 
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN 2 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249822.pdf 
(interpreting data from the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NIPSVS), a report launched 
by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and partially funded by the National Institute of Justice). 
NIPSVS respondents were from a nationally representative sample of over 4,000 adults who identified 
themselves as either American Indian or Alaska Native. The female respondents reported violence in 2015 in 
the following categories: 14.4% experienced sexual violence, 8.6% experienced physical violence by an intimate 
partner, 11.6% experienced stalking, and 25.5% experienced psychological aggression by an intimate partner. 
Id.  
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in the United States.15 In the year studied, Rosay found American Indian and 
Alaska Native women were 1.7 times more likely to experience violence 
compared to white women.16 Of all American Indian and Alaska Native survey 
respondents who reported experiencing violence in their lifetime, ninety-seven 
percent had experienced violence by a non-Indian, non-native person.17  
As astounding as these numbers are, statistics alone likely do not tell the 
whole story. Domestic violence is typically under-reported. “For many reasons 
that include the stigma often attached to intimate partner violence, the fear of 
retaliation from their perpetrators, and numerous other safety concerns, 
estimating incidence rates of this violence has always been a difficult task.”18 
Available statistics are unclear on whether reported rates of victimization are 
increasing or decreasing on Indian lands.19 Nevertheless, the present 
victimization rate—nearly one in seven—remain unacceptably high. 
An examination of the nature of domestic violence is helpful in trying to 
grasp the magnitude of the problem of domestic violence in Indian country. 
Domestic violence, and more specifically intimate partner violence, are much 
broader phenomena, with more derivative behaviors, than the terms suggest. As 
one might expect, domestic violence manifests through acts of physical abuse 
such as battering and strangulation, but also through less obvious forms of harm 
such as financial abuse, psychological abuse, and stalking.20 At its core, 
domestic violence is a pattern of behavior in which an abuser attempts to exert 
control over his victim.21 Dr. Lenore Walker, a key psychological theorist in the 
field of domestic violence, has described and illuminated tactics used by abusers 
in carrying out this control: 
[B]atterers consciously isolate women from others; women also withdraw from 
society to protect others from harm and themselves from embarrassment. Three 
times as many battered women as nonbattered women are isolated financially 
because they have “no access to cash.” And twenty-two percent of women in 
abusive relationships (versus only thirteen percent in nonabusive relationships) 
have no access to a car. Regarding other controlling behaviors . . . whereas 
battered women were not permitted to go places three-quarters of the time, 
 
 15. See id. (comparing the domestic violence rates of Natives to those experienced by non-Hispanic 
whites); see also STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERICAN 
INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002, at iii–v (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/aic.pdf (comparing rates of violent victimizations experienced by Natives to those of other U.S. racial 
or ethnic groups). 
 16. Rosay, supra note 14, at 2. 
 17. Id. at 4. The NIPSVS does not specify a percentage of survey respondents who were victims of 
domestic violence by non-Indians in 2015. See id. 
 18. RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 27 (2008).  
 19. Compare id. at 47 (“American Indian and Alaska Native women have the highest rate of victimization 
(18.2) . . . .”), with ROSAY, supra note 14, at 2 (finding 14.4% have experienced sexual violence and 8.6% 
experienced physical violence in the year prior to the study). 
 20. See Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic 
Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1116–18 (2009).  
 21. Id. 
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nonbattered women were not permitted to go places only one-quarter of the time. 
Also, batterers, unlike nonabusive partners, knew where their victims were at 
almost all times.22 
These are just a few of the many behaviors used by batterers to isolate and abuse 
their partners. 
In the specific context of violence against women in Indian country, other 
unique concerns also play a role. Colonization and historical trauma experienced 
by Indian communities also played a role in making Indian women uniquely 
vulnerable to domestic violence.23 
[Federal policies of] [r]emoval, relocation, and assimilate[on] resulted in loss of 
traditional homelands and lifestyles, creation of dependency on the federal 
government, loss of identity and traditional cultural knowledge, the placement of 
Native women at greater risk for violence, disruption in family life and parenting, 
and loss of familiar and communal support systems.24  
This background leaves Native women in a position unique among any 
victimized group.25 As discussed in more depth in infra Parts I and II, several 
problems relate to and exacerbate the epidemic facing women in Indian country 
such as insufficient funding, unclear jurisdiction for law enforcement, and 
victims’ lack of trust in federal law enforcement.26  
Sometimes overlooked in the academic discussion of SDVCJ are the 
lasting negative consequences that the inability to hold batterers accountable has 
on victims in tribal communities. When perpetrators of domestic violence are 
enabled to continue their abuses, victims suffer. While this is the exact problem 
that SDVCJ sought to fix, again, for so many tribes it is simply not possible to 
implement the measures required to use it, and as a result, victims continue to 
suffer.27 An ineffective criminal justice system effectively silences victims, who 
are discouraged from reporting abuses for fear of retaliation, and emboldens 
offenders, thereby perpetuating a cycle of violence in tribal lands.28  
Additionally, the collateral consequences of domestic violence on Indian 
lands are another cause for alarm. One of the leading causes of homelessness 
among women is domestic violence.29 American Indian and Alaskan Native 
 
 22. Id. at 1119 (footnotes omitted); see also LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
7 (4th ed. 2017) (“Men continue to use physical, sexual, and psychological abuse to obtain and maintain power 
and control over women and children, because they can.”). 
 23. Roe Bubar & Pamela Jumper Thurman, Violence Against Native Women, 31 SOC. JUST. 70, 73 (2004).  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 73–75. 
 26. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 9. 
 27. See Lorelei Laird, Indian Tribes Are Retaking Jurisdiction over Domestic Violence on Their Own Land, 
A.B.A. J. (Apr. 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/indian_tribes_are_retaking_jurisdiction_ 
over_domestic_violence_on_their_own. 
 28. See NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT 4 (2018) [hereinafter FIVE-YEAR REPORT] (discussing how the rulings that 
tribes did not have jurisdiction over non-Indians perpetuated victims living in fear because of the lack of 
accountability by abusers).  
 29. See Rose Quilt et al., Domestic Violence and Housing Across Tribal Nations, Alaska Native Villages 
and Indian Communities, NAT’L INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S RESOURCE CTR. (Dec. 14, 2017), 
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women face homelessness at five times the national level.30 Making matters 
worse, out of the 573 federally recognized tribes, there are only sixty tribal 
domestic violence shelters.31 These problems underlie the thesis advanced in this 
Note. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON TRIBAL JURISDICTION 
As described by Professor Angela R. Riley,32 “[t]he criminal justice crisis 
that exists in Indian country today is a manifestation of a failure of law so 
extreme that it has actually caused reservation crime to flourish.”33 Indeed, the 
current struggle on Indian lands is a product of federal government 
policymaking that has steered American Indian affairs throughout U.S. history.34 
Historically, federal policy has been guided by two overarching, competing 
principles: the first respects the distinctness of Indian people and recognizing 
tribal sovereignty; and the second focuses on a steady assimilation of Indians 
into non-Indian society.35 The tension between these two views provides a 
backstop for the jurisdictional conflict created by federal policy, and was only 
partially resolved by the SDVCJ provision in VAWA 2013. While an exhaustive 
look into the history of federal-Indian relations is outside the scope of this Note, 




and-indian (noting that collateral crimes such as assaults on arresting police officers are not covered by VAWA). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Angela R. Riley is a Professor of Law at UCLA School of Law and the Director of UCLA’s Native 
Nations Law and Policy Center. 
 33. Riley, supra note 12, at 1574. 
 34. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2015). 
 35. See id.; WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 13 (6th ed. 2015) (“At some 
times, the prevailing view has regarded the tribes as enduring bodies for which a geographical base would have 
to be established and more or less protected. At other times, the dominant position has been that the tribes are or 
should be in the process of decline and disappearance, and that their members should be absorbed into the mass 
of non-Indian society.”).  
 36. For a comprehensive historical summary of federal-Indian relations, see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).  
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A.  CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS & THE “JURISDICTIONAL 
MAZE”37 OF FEDERAL, INDIAN, & STATE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
The United States Constitution addresses interactions between the Indian 
tribes and the United States in the so-called Indian Commerce Clause,38 and in 
the treaty power outlined in Article II, Section II.39 In a trilogy of early Indian 
law cases decided and authored by then-Chief Justice Marshall,40 the U.S. 
Supreme Court interpreted the federal government’s constitutional powers and 
established that the federal government had exclusive authority over affairs with 
Native Americans, superseding both individual citizens’ and states’ influence.41 
The Marshall Court articulated tribes’ status as that of “domestic dependent 
nations,” embodying simultaneous characteristics of sovereigns and “wards” of 
the federal government.42 When it comes to tribal criminal jurisdiction, a central 
theme has been the steady erosion of tribal sovereignty at the hands of the federal 
power outlined in the Marshall Trilogy and expanded throughout the twentieth 
century.43 
The earliest days of interaction between tribes and the United States were 
vastly different from today. Professor Catherine Struve44 provides a useful 
synopsis of this early history of Indian sovereignty:  
Prior to European contact, Indian tribes exercised full sovereign authority; 
after contact, the European powers dealt with the tribes by means of treaties. The 
young United States continued the practice of treating tribes as sovereigns, 
negotiating and entering into treaties with them until 1871. In substance, the 
federal and state governments’ treatment of Indian nations sometimes ranged 
from the unfair to the genocidal. During the early nineteenth century, for 
 
 37. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a 
Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976) (“This Article, by providing the historical context from which 
this labyrinth emerged, hopefully provides an historical guide through the jurisdictional maze that presently 
exists.” (emphasis added)). For a useful graphic comparison of criminal jurisdiction in Indian lands, see JUSTIN 
B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 71–72, 185 (3d ed. 2016). 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have Power to] regulate Commerce . . . with the 
Indian Tribes.”). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM. 
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015) (“The constitutional text addresses two means by which Indian tribes 
and the United States interact.”); Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 670 (2013) (“The sparse guidance the Constitution itself provides on the 
status of America’s native peoples seems to place Indian tribes in an intermediate category between foreign and 
domestic states.”). 
 40. The “Marshall Trilogy” of cases (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)) were a series of 
Supreme Court opinions that framed the boundaries of tribal-state-federal relations as they would come to be 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. For a well-framed overview, see Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and 
Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 140–42 (2004). 
 41. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AM. INDIANS, intro. note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015). 
For further discussion into the drafting and constitutional interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause, see 
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 57–63 (2009). 
 42. Price, supra note 39, at 670. 
 43. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 41, at 59–63; Riley, supra note 12, at 1579. 
 44. Catherine Struve is a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where she 
teaches and researches in the fields of civil procedure and federal courts. 
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example, non-Indians used pressure tactics and violence in their efforts to obtain 
tribal lands, and the federal government ultimately pressed on the southeastern 
tribes the policy of “removal” from the tribes’ homelands to lands west of the 
Mississippi. It was a brutal policy; when the last Cherokees east of the Mississippi 
moved west along the Trail of Tears, the conditions before, during and after the 
journey were so harsh that some 4,000 of them died. In form, however, the federal 
government treated the tribes as sovereign entities. Thus, for example, the 
removal of the southeastern tribes occurred pursuant to “treaties” purportedly 
entered into by those tribes.45 
Tribes would continue to suffer this drain of their original status at the 
hands of the federal government, whether by force or court decision.46 This, of 
course, underlies the frustration felt by Native American advocates in the 
domestic violence realm.  
Sovereignty has a direct corollary to authority over criminal activity. When 
it comes to criminal authority, a tribe’s power to govern and employ jurisdiction 
over crimes committed within its territory is a direct product of its sovereignty.47 
As the prevailing doctrine of federal law holds, such power can only be 
diminished when a tribe voluntarily cedes it, or when Congress acts 
affirmatively to take that power away through its authority based in the Marshall 
Trilogy.48 This core doctrine, coupled with the concept of “implicit divestiture,” 
conflicts directly with the sovereignty tribes rightfully have and never properly 
relinquished.49  
Of course, this Note would not have a purpose were it not for the present 
problems in tribal criminal jurisdiction. A complicated web of history and law 
laid the groundwork for these issues. The earliest symptoms of our current 
jurisdictional issues started benignly enough—by the late 1700s, certain treaties 
between tribes and the federal government allowed for shared criminal 
jurisdiction over certain interracial crimes.50 But two major federal laws enacted 
in the 1800s created a far different jurisdictional landscape in Indian country, 
namely, the General Crimes Act of 181751 and the Major Crimes Act of 1885.52 
While the General Crimes Act extended federal criminal laws to apply in Indian 
country, it specifically did not apply to internal crimes between Indians.53 Going 
a step further, the Major Crimes Act removed tribes’ jurisdiction entirely from 
serious crimes like murder and kidnapping, regardless of whether the perpetrator 
 
 45. Struve, supra note 40, at 138–40 (footnotes omitted). 
 46. See id. at 139–43. 
 47. See Jacqueline P. Hand & David C. Koelsch, Shared Experiences, Divergent Outcomes: American 
Indian and Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, 25 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 185, 196 (2010); Riley, 
supra note 12, at 1576–77. 
 48. Hand & Koelsch, supra note 47, at 196. For further discussion, see infra Part II. 
 49. See discussion of Oliphant, infra text accompanying note 65. 
 50. Riley, supra note 12, at 1577. For an expansive analysis of tribal jurisdiction during the treaty period, 
see Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 
ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 953–58 (1975). 
 51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 52. See id. § 1153. 
 53. Riley, supra note 12, at 1577. 
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and/or victim were Indian.54 This latter statute grew directly in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog, which held federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction to try a member of the Brule Sioux tribe for the murder of a 
Brule Sioux Chief.55  
The most significant complications in criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands 
took place in the past century. Congress enacted Public Law 280 in 1953, which 
transferred federal criminal jurisdiction to certain states, giving those states 
jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated in the Indian country located within the 
states’ borders.56 In Public Law 280, Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin (the “mandatory states”), assumed partial federal 
criminal jurisdiction over the Indian country within their state boundaries.57 The 
resulting system was a complicated web of concurrent and exclusive 
jurisdictions between the tribal, state, and federal governments that differed 
based on location, crime, offender, and victim.58 Public Law 280 was essentially 
a post-war federal budget reduction policy.59 Consequently, tribes falling in 
Public Law 280 jurisdictions found themselves in the midst of a criminal justice 
system with confused boundaries and essentially no guaranteed funding.60 And 
since states typically had little interest in devoting resources to Indian country 
law enforcement, tribes in Public Law 280 states quickly found themselves in a 
vacuum of adequate policing and supporting judicial infrastructure.61 The Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 further defined the nature of Indian justice proceedings, 
setting forth the rights Indian governments must guarantee to individual Indians 
and limiting the penal authority of tribal courts beyond imposing a $5,000 fine 
or one year of imprisonment.62 
The discussion so far has largely brushed over exactly what criminal 
authority was exercised by tribes before Western interference. In fact, the classic 
Western adversarial criminal justice model “was imposed onto tribes in the 
 
 54. Hand & Koelsch, supra note 47, at 196. 
 55. 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883); see also Clinton, supra note 50, at 963. The Sioux tribal council found Crow 
Dog responsible for the murder of a tribal chief, and under an application of traditional Brule Sioux law, Crow 
Dog was ordered to pay restitution to the victim’s family. Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog’s Case: A Chapter in 
the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 198–99 (1998). 
 56. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 
(2012)). Public Law 280 specifically exempted certain tribes, and thus does not apply to all situations within 
certain states subjected to Public Law 280 jurisdiction. See id. 
 57. Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 
47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1998). 
 58. DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 
280, at 6–9 (2012).  
 59. Id. at 13. 
 60. See id.  
 61. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian 
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1417–18 (1997). 
 62. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–04 (2012)); see also Riley, supra note 12, at 1581. The Act originally provided for lower punishment 
authority, but it was amended in 1986 to raise penal limits to a $5,000 fine and one year of imprisonment. Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 202(B). 
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nineteenth century, specifically to disrupt and destroy tribal cultures, Indian 
justice systems, and traditional dispute resolution practices.”63 Before this 
meddling, many tribes practiced local, restorative justice, which bore little 
resemblance to the proceedings often required today.64 Some of these practices 
will play a key role in the discussion infra Parts II and III. 
Arguably the most significant development in tribal criminal jurisdiction, 
however, was the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, which held that Indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians.65 The Court based its holding in large part on the theory that tribes 
“submit[ted] to the overriding sovereignty of the United States,” thereby 
forfeiting the power they may have had earlier.66 This “implicit divestiture” 
doctrine, as it later came to be known, formed the foundation for a new and 
controversial principle that shaped decades of the Court’s federal Indian law 
jurisprudence.67 The fallout from Oliphant left tribes powerless and completely 
reliant on the federal government (or state governments in Public Law 280 
states) to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians on Indian 
lands.68 Geographic isolation and mistrust made federal law enforcement and 
prosecutors uniquely ill-suited to enforce criminal laws—particularly those as 
personal and localized as domestic violence laws—on tribal lands as crime and 
violence flourished over the ensuing years.69 Federal policy languished at this 
nadir of injustice for nearly forty years. 
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT OF 2010 & 
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013 
Major change in Federal Indian policy eluded tribal leaders and survivors 
of domestic violence for decades.70 Finally, by the mid-2000s, recognition of the 
problem on Native lands began to move into the national spotlight.71 A 
“convergence of media coverage, targeted advocacy, coalition building, and 
lobbying” would be the foundation upon which Congress enacted two laws 
signaling a marked change: the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA) and, 
soon after it, VAWA 2013.72 
 
 63. Riley, supra note 12, at 1579 (footnotes omitted). 
 64. See id. at 1579, 1620. 
 65. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
 66. Id. at 210; see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 41, at 219 (discussing the Oliphant decision). 
 67. Lance F. Sorenson, Tribal Sovereignty and the Recognition Power, 42 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 69, 82–89 
(2017).  
 68. See Hand & Koelsch, supra note 47, at 197. 
 69. Id. at 197–98; Riley, supra note 12, at 1582–83. 
 70. Riley, supra note 12, at 1584. 
 71. SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE: CONFRONTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NATIVE 
AMERICA 99 (2015).  
 72. Riley, supra note 12, at 1584–85. 
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1.  The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 
TLOA was based on several key findings, among them that the complex 
criminal jurisdiction scheme in Indian country has had a significant adverse 
effect on public safety in Indian communities.73 TLOA contains three key 
provisions. First, TLOA grants enhanced sentencing authority to tribes 
(amending the Indian Civil Rights Act), which allows tribes to sentence criminal 
defendants to up to three years imprisonment and a $15,000 fine.74 But the 
enhanced penal authority under TLOA is only available to tribal courts that 
ensure certain procedural safeguards,75 and may only be exercised over specific 
crimes.76 TLOA did nothing to expand the jurisdictional reach of tribal courts, 
leaving in place the framework of Oliphant. Second, TLOA contains a 
transparency measure that requires the federal government to compile and report 
crimes that occur in Indian country that federal prosecutors decline to 
prosecute.77 The third key provision was the creation and funding of the Indian 
Law and Order Commission, tasked with conducting a “comprehensive study of 
law enforcement and criminal justice in tribal communities.”78 The Indian Law 
and Order Commission’s charter resulted in the 2013 publication A Roadmap 
for Making Native America Safer, which advocated for tribe-centric solutions 
and greater cooperation from federal and state law enforcement agencies.79 
2.  The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 
Shortly after the passage of TLOA, another radical shift in federal Indian 
policy occurred in response to the epidemic of domestic violence in Indian 
country. In the wake of Oliphant, stories emerged of non-Indian batterers 
emboldened to victimize their Indian partners because of the immunity they 
enjoyed on Indian lands.80 The story of survivors like Diane Millich, a native of 
the Southern Ute Tribe in southern Colorado, sent chills all the way to Congress: 
At age twenty-six Millich married a white man, and the couple moved to her 
home on the Southern Ute reservation in Colorado. Shortly after they were 
 
 73. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2279 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Among the requirements, the tribal court must: (1) provide equivalent effective assistance of counsel, 
(2) provide a judge licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction, and (3) make records publically available. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. §§ 211–12. For the most recent TLOA report as of this Note’s publication, see U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, INDIAN COUNTRY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 3, 29–30 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
tribal/page/file/1113091/download (reporting 891 declined prosecutions in calendar year 2017, 37% of the 
DOJ’s Indian country caseload). The DOJ maintains that “[d]eclinations alone do not provide an accurate 
accounting of the [United States Attorney’s Offices’] handling of Indian country criminal cases.” Id. at 38. 
 78. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 § 235, 124 Stat. at 2282, 2283 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1302). 
 79. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT & CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES vii (2013), https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/ 
A_Roadmap_For_Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf [hereinafter ROADMAP]. 
 80. RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 37, at 188. 
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married, he began beating her. During repeated bouts of violence, Millich called 
tribal police and county sheriffs, but to no avail. Because her husband was non-
Indian, the Southern Ute Tribal Police had no jurisdiction over him; because she 
was a Native American on tribal land, the La Plata County sheriff deputies had 
no jurisdiction either. In this “jurisdictional black hole” only federal law 
enforcement officials could prosecute the perpetrator, and Millich’s pleas for help 
went nowhere. Millich has recounted that, “[a]fter one beating, my ex-husband 
called the tribal police and the sheriff’s department himself, just to show me that 
no one could stop him.” Eventually, he stormed into her workplace with a gun 
and shot her coworker, who took a bullet to the shoulder to save her life. The 
perpetrator was only arrested after investigators “use[d] a tape measure to sort 
out jurisdiction, gauging the distance between the barrel of the gun and the point 
of bullet impact to persuade the local police to intervene.”81 
Stories like these were all too common in the post-Oliphant world.  
Along with tribal advocates and others, Congress responded with a 
groundbreaking piece of legislation in VAWA 2013, which sweepingly declared 
“the powers of self-government of a participating tribe include the inherent 
power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.”82 This SDVCJ 
provision, or “partial-Oliphant fix” as commentators referred to it, mended part 
of the hole left by Oliphant by restoring tribal jurisdiction over crimes of 
domestic violence committed by non-Indians on tribal lands.83 VAWA 2013 also 
provided tribal courts “full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce protection 
orders involving any person,” allowing tribes to enforce civil protection orders 
consistent with federal law and due process.84  
Tribal use of the SDVCJ provisions, however, is limited in several respects. 
The crime itself must be “domestic violence or dating violence that occurs in the 
Indian country of the participating tribe,” or a violation of a protection order 
issued against the non-Indian defendant that is enforceable by the Indian tribe.85 
Additionally, a tribe can only exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants 
 
 81. Riley, supra note 12, at 1590–91 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Jonathan 
Weisman, Measure to Protect Women Stuck on Tribal Land Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/politics/violence-against-women-act-held-up-by-tribal-land 
issue.html; then quoting Laird, supra note 27; and then quoting Weisman, supra). 
 82. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 127 Stat. 54 (codified 
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (Supp. I 2013)). 
 83. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 37, at 188; Riley, supra note 12, at 1591.  
 84. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 905, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2265(e) (Supp. I 2013)). 
 85. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c)(1). The Act defines “domestic violence” as 
violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by a person with 
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated 
with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse of the 
victim under the domestic—or family—violence laws of an Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the 
Indian country where the violence occurs.  
Id. § 1304(a)(2). The Act defines “dating violence” as “violence committed by a person who is or has been in a 
social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim, as determined by the length of the 
relationship, the type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between the persons involved in the 
relationship.” Id. § 1304(a)(1). 
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with sufficient “ties to the Indian tribe,” defined as a defendant who: (1) resides 
in the territory of the Indian tribe; (2) is employed by the Indian tribe; or (3) is a 
“spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner” of a member or resident of a 
participating Indian tribe.86 
As with TLOA, a tribe may only exercise SDVCJ if the tribe provides 
heightened procedural protections to defendants—protections the tribe would 
not otherwise be required to provide to Indian defendants.87 If the tribe seeks to 
punish by any term of imprisonment, all procedural requirements of TLOA must 
be satisfied, including providing the defendant effective assistance of counsel, 
using a presiding judge licensed to practice law, and making records of the 
proceeding publically available.88 In addition to the TLOA requirements, tribes 
exercising SDVCJ must provide defendants a right to jury trial representing a 
“cross section of the community” that does not specifically exclude any group 
of people.89 Defendants must also be notified of all their procedural rights, 
including the right to stay their detention by the tribe after filing a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal court.90 If a tribe cannot provide or fails to provide the requisite 
protections to a non-Indian defendant, the tribe has no power under the law to 
convict that defendant.91 
Finally, VAWA 2013 authorized $5 million to be appropriated each fiscal 
year from 2014 through 2018 to aid tribes in their exercise of SDVCJ and to 
assist tribal victims of domestic violence.92 This generally recognizes the 
extraordinary costs that coincide with implementing an often entirely new 
justice system that is compatible with SDVCJ. As Professor Riley notes, VAWA 
2013’s funding provisions also act to support and recognize tribes’ inherent 
rights to exercise, where appropriate, their own “culturally suitable” alternatives 
to incarceration.93 However, the funding authorized in VAWA 2013 has fallen 
short of expectations in several respects.94  
 
 86. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
 87. See generally id. § 1302 (discussing constitutional restraints). 
 88. Id. § 1304(d) (incorporating by reference sections of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010).  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id § 1304(e)(2). For further discussion of the implications of the habeas relief available under SDVCJ 
prosecutions, see generally Hunter Cox, ICRA Habeas Corpus Relief: A New Habeas Jurisprudence for the Post-
Oliphant World?, 5 AM. INDIAN L.J. 596 (2017). 
 91. Another VAWA 2013 provision requires a tribe exercising SDVCJ to provide “all other rights whose 
protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm 
the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4). Congress debated this provision but declined to clarify it prior to passage 
of the Act. Riley, supra note 12, at 1594 n.151 (“Although there was some discussion and debate about this 
provision of the statute, its scope and content was not clarified prior to the pass of the Act.”). 
 92. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(h).  
 93. Id. § 1304(f)(1)(G) (including as an option for strengthening tribal criminal justice systems “culturally 
appropriate services and assistance for victims and their families”); Riley, supra note 12, at 1592.  
 94. See infra Part II. 
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II.  WHERE WE ARE TODAY 
This Part discusses the early effect SDVCJ has had on tribal nations, 
relying largely on the 2018 National Congress of American Indians (NCAI)95 
report on the five-year effects of VAWA 2013. This Part closes with an 
examination of contemporary criticisms and the constitutional arguments for and 
against tribal exercise of SDVCJ. 
A.  EARLY EFFECTS & THE NCAI FIVE-YEAR REPORT 
Although VAWA 2013 was signed into law on March 7, 2013, the SDVCJ 
provisions had a two-year delaying feature, preventing any tribe from exercising 
SDVCJ for the Act’s first two years unless the tribe was accepted to participate 
in the “pilot project” administered by the United States Department of Justice.96 
Three tribes participated in the pilot long enough to provide data to a report 
organized by the National Congress of American Indians to study early effects 
and give recommendations.97 The three tribes, the Confederated Tribes of the 
Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR) in Oregon, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in 
Arizona, and the Tulalip Tribes of Washington, were approved to implement 
SDVCJ in February 2014 and all had cases during the pilot program window.98 
In the year spanning February 20, 2014 through March 6, 2015, “the three 
original pilot tribes had a total of 27 SDVCJ cases involving 23 separate 
offenders. Of the 27 cases, 11 were ultimately dismissed for jurisdictional or 
investigative reasons, 10 resulted in guilty pleas, 5 were referred for federal 
prosecution and 1 offender was acquitted by a jury.”99 These results were 
generally seen as a resounding success for the tribal communities, particularly 
those involved in the program.100 Reporting rates are up, which in the context of 
 
 95. The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) is an organization representing the interests of 
American Indian and Alaska Natives. Its stated purposes are: 
to serve as a forum for unified policy development among tribal governments in order to: (1) protect 
and advance tribal governance and treaty rights; (2) promote the economic development and health 
and welfare in Indian and Alaska Native communities; and (3) educate the public toward a better 
understanding of Indian and Alaska Native tribes. 
About NCAI, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/about-ncai (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 96. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(h).  
 97. Three other tribes, approved to implement SDVCJ on March 6, 2015, were the Assiniboine and Sioux 
Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana and the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse 
Reservation in North and South Dakota. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION PILOT PROJECT REPORT 40 (2015), http://www.ncai.org/attachments/NewsArticle_ 
VutTUSYSfGPRpZQRYzWcuLekuVNeeTAOBBwGyvkWYwPRUJOioqI_SDVCJ%20Pilot%20Project%20
Report_6-7-16_Final.pdf. 
 98. Id. at 1–2. 
 99. Id. at 5.  
 100. See S. 2785, A Bill to Protect Native Children and Promote Public Safety in Indian Country; S. 2916, 
A Bill to Provide that the Pueblo of Santa Clara May Lease for 99 Years Certain Restricted Land and for Other 
Purposes; and S. 2920, The Tribal Law and Order Reauthorization Act of 2016: Hearing on S. 2785, S. 2916, 
and S. 2920 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 114th Cong. 15 (2016) (prepared statement of Tracy Toulou, 
Director, Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice) (“The three original Pilot Project tribes achieved 
notable success implementing SDVCJ during the Pilot Project period from February 2014 through March 
70.4-GURNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2019  1:19 PM 
902 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:887 
domestic violence in Indian communities is likely a positive sign—signifying an 
increased confidence that perpetrators will be held accountable.101 But Professor 
Riley also identified that the pilot tribes already had essentially all of the 
procedural requirements in place to implement SDVCJ, such as law-trained 
judges and recognition of indigent defendants’ right to counsel.102 Other tribes 
without the resources and judicial infrastructure to take advantage of VAWA 
2013 simply do not have any reasonable ability to implement these laws on their 
own lands.103  
To date, eighteen of the 573 federally recognized tribes104 are known to 
have implemented SDVCJ, most of which have already begun to prosecute non-
Indian perpetrators of domestic violence.105 Those implementing tribes vary in 
size, population, diversity, and geographic location. They include widely diverse 
populations of non-Indians living on their tribal lands, and are located in the 
Northwest Coast, the American Southwest, the Great Plains, and the 
Southeast.106 Additionally, fifty total tribes participate in the Inter-Tribal 
Technical Assistance Working Group (ITWG), a collaborative group established 
by the U.S. Department of Justice to facilitate the sharing of information and 
best practices in implementing SDVCJ.107  
The 2018 NCAI report on the five-year effects of SDVCJ, the first of its 
kind, provides a comprehensive overview of the current status and effectiveness 
 
2015.”); Riley, supra note 12, at 1595 (“By most accounts, TLOA and VAWA stand as enormous victorious for 
Indian country.”). 
 101. Riley, supra note 12, at 1605; cf. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 27 (describing domestic violence 
as a historically underreported crime). 
 102. Riley, supra note 12, at 1606. 
 103. See id. at 1596 (“For some tribes-particularly—those that do not already have criminal courts in place, 
have very small reservation populations to draw from for human capital, or have limited funds with over- 
whelming social problems requiring their scant resources—implementation may not be feasible or even 
desirable.”). 
 104. Jefferson Keel, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Remarks at the Sixteenth Annual State of Indian 
Nations Address (Feb. 12, 2018). 
 105. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 1, 5 n.iv, 42–60 (“Since the end of the pilot period, tribes are not 
required to notify the DOJ if they begin exercising SDVCJ. This report covers the 18 implementing tribes that 
have reported implementation to NCAI and its partner technical assistance providers, although it remains a 
possibility that there are other tribes implementing SDVCJ.”). Those eighteen implementing tribes are: the 
Pascua Yaqui Tribe in Arizona, the Tulalip Tribes in Washington, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation in Oregon, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana, the 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation in North and South Dakota, the Little Traverse Bay 
Band of Odawa Indians in Michigan, the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas, the Choctaw Nation in Oklahoma, 
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina, the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma, the Sac and Fox 
Nation in Oklahoma, the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi in 
Michigan, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Oklahoma, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in North and South 
Dakota, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa in Michigan, the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana, and the Lower 
Elwha Klallam Tribe in Washington. Id. at 6.  
 106. Id. at 17–18. 
 107. Id. at 1; see also NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, POLICY UPDATE 20–21 (2017), 
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_zZTmwUgiMOBFwXQKgNIDMPzHsGLyRoEArzrzjCwRJtJz
nxBGJFJ_Annual%20Policy%20Update%202017%20-%20Final%2010.13.pdf.  
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of the law.108 The report compiles critical data and stories from all corners of the 
SDVCJ-exercising world, with some of the key prosecution numbers as follows: 
Of the 143 arrests for SDVCJ-related crimes, 52 percent have resulted in 
convictions, while 18 percent have resulted in acquittals or dismissals. Of the 
cases that were ultimately filed, 21 percent were dismissed or resulted in 
acquittals. Tribes report that the cases are dismissed, or they are unable to 
prosecute for a range of reasons including: uncooperative witnesses, insufficient 
evidence, determination that the tribe lacks jurisdiction, filing errors, plea deals 
on other cases, or detention by another jurisdiction.109 
As with most American court systems, the majority of SDVCJ convictions 
came through plea bargains, with relatively few jury trials.110 In Summer 2017, 
the Pascua Yaqui Tribe became the first to convict a defendant by jury trial 
through an exercise of SDVCJ.111 Recognizing the roles non-Indian defendants 
may have in tribal communities, the exercising tribes also emphasized batterer 
intervention or other tribal rehabilitation programs in their proceedings.112 The 
report concluded by recognizing the serious limitations the current law imposes 
on tribes implementing SDVCJ, including a bevy of ancillary crimes not 
chargeable by the tribe such as child abuse and drug and alcohol crimes.113 
Although VAWA 2013 authorized $5 million to be spent on SDVCJ 
implementation each fiscal year from 2014 to 2018, “[o]ver the past two years, 
OVW has awarded $5,684,939 in competitive grant funds to 14 different tribes 
to support their implementation of SDVCJ. Only four implementing tribes—
Tulalip, Little Traverse Bay Band, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and 
Standing Rock—have received any of these grant funds.”114 Launching and 
exercising SDVCJ is still prohibitively expensive for nearly all tribes.115  
In encouraging recent news, it appears the Justice Department has 
committed to providing additional funds in fiscal year 2018. By the end of 
September 2018, the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) will award 
nearly $55 million to tribes and tribal nonprofit organizations through VAWA 
 
 108. See generally FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28. 
 109. Id. at 18. 
 110. Id. at 19. 
 111. Debra Utacia Krol, Pascua Yaqui Tribe First to Use VAWA to Prosecute Non-Indian, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY (June 9, 2017), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/pascua-yaqui-tribe-first-to-use-vawa-
to-prosecute-non-indian-DaUpRysbBkCp7qEnIVXnJQ/. 
 112. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 20. 
 113. Id. at 22–26. 
 114. Id. at 30 (footnote omitted); see also OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (OVW), U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OVW FISCAL YEAR 2017 GRANTS TO TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS TO EXERCISE SPECIAL DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/915261/download 
(providing an example of a spending program application authorized pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1304(f), described 
supra Part I). 
 115. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 29–30. 
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programs, which includes a carve-out for the exercise of SDVCJ.116 It remains 
to be seen what portion of that funding will go towards SDVCJ implementation. 
B. CURRENT CRITICISMS 
The academic and popular discourse around SDVCJ is, on the whole, very 
positive. By most accounts, the passage of VAWA 2013 was a tremendous 
victory for tribal nations nationwide, signifying an incremental step towards 
federally supported Indian self-determination.117 Indigenous leaders like Keith 
Harper, a former ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Council, 
described SDVCJ as placing tribal communities “in a better posture to address 
the challenges they face,” while making “safer and ultimately more prosperous 
communities.”118 But like all things, SDVCJ is not without its share of skeptics. 
This Part addresses some of the major criticisms and concerns regarding SDVCJ. 
1.  Constitutionality of Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction 
SDVCJ has never been challenged in court. As such, the debate 
surrounding its constitutionality remains only academic. But that is not to say 
such debate is irrelevant. Given the significance of defendants’ procedural rights 
in criminal proceedings and the prospect of avoiding criminal punishment on 
constitutional grounds, it is only a matter of time before a defendant decides to 
challenge SDVCJ. The weight of such a decision and the uncertainties in 
relevant constitutional doctrines, discussed in depth below, could very well 
prompt the Supreme Court to take up any eventual appeal.  
Prominent among critics of SDVCJ is Paul Larkin of the Heritage 
Institute,119 who has argued that by enacting VAWA 2013’s SDVCJ provisions, 
Congress violated structural constitutional safeguards in Articles II and III of the 
United States Constitution.120 Article II provides for the appointment power of 
all “Officers of the United States” in the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.121 Larkin’s argument asserts that SDVCJ runs afoul of the 
Executive’s Article II appointment power because tribal judges are appointed 
according to tribes’ own law and custom and not by the President of the United 
 
 116. Acting Associate Attorney General Jesse Panuccio Delivers Keynote Address at 2018 Violence Against 
Women Tribal Consultation, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-
associate-attorney-general-jesse-panuccio-delivers-keynote-address-2018-violence.  
 117. See, e.g., Brian Cladoosby, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Remarks at the Twelfth Annual 
State of Indian Nations Address (Jan. 30, 2014). 
 118. Krol, supra note 111 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Keith Harper, Cherokee attorney and 
former ambassador to the U.N. Human Rights Council). 
 119. Paul Larkin is a Senior Legal Research Fellow at the Heritage Institute, an organization with a mission 
to “formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited 
government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.” About Heritage, 
HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/about-heritage/mission (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). 
 120. See Paul Larkin, Jr., Domestic Abuse on Indian Reservations: How Congress Failed to Protect Women 
Against Violence, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/civil-rights/report/domestic-
abuse-indian-reservations-how-congress-failed-protect-women-against#_ftnref13.  
 121. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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States.122 Since a tribal judge ordering a non-Indian to imprisonment through 
SDVCJ is “a classic example of the type of government power that only a person 
properly appointed under Article II can exercise,” Congress thereby improperly 
‘appoints’ officers of the United States in violation of Article II when it allows 
tribes to exercise SDVCJ over non-Indian defendants.123 
Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme 
Court and such inferior courts subsequently established by Congress, and 
provides life tenure and guaranteed salaries to judges.124 Larkin’s Article III 
argument posits that tribal judges ordering non-Indians to imprisonment is a 
quintessential exercise of the “Judicial Power” of the United States.125 And since 
tribal judges do not enjoy the protections of life tenure and salary assurances, 
Larkin argues, any tribal exercise of SDVCJ violates Article III on its face.126 
Larkin’s arguments are intriguing, but not quite complete. As Tom Gede,127 
former Commissioner of the Indian Law and Order Commission, has suggested, 
Larkin’s Article II and III arguments assume SDVCJ involves a delegation of 
U.S. criminal jurisdiction to tribes, rather than a tribal exercise of inherent 
authority.128 Put another way, if the basis for exercising criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians comes from within tribes’ sovereign authority, Articles II and 
III simply would not pose any structural, constitutional bar to tribes prosecuting 
non-Indians. Under such a framework, tribal judges prosecuting non-Indians 
through SDVCJ would not be “Officers of the United States,” and thus would 
not require presidential appointment.129 Further, tribes exercising SDVCJ under 
an inherent authority would not be wielding the “Judicial Power” of the United 
States—tribes would simply be exercising their own power—and thus tribal 
judges would not be subject to life tenure requirements and protection against 
salary reduction. This reasoning reflects one of the strongest positions on tribal 
authority, one which is consistent with the broadest views of tribal sovereignty 
and power. 
Recall that Congress described the “Nature of the Criminal Jurisdiction” 
(that is, the nature of SDVCJ) as follows: “the powers of self-government of a 
participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby 
recognized and affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction over all persons.”130 Taken at face value, this passage leaves no 
 
 122. Larkin, supra note 120.  
 123. Id. Larkin’s article on the Heritage.org website is an abridged version of a full-length article previously 
published. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Joseph Luppino-Esposito, The Violence Against Women Act, Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 20–24 (2012).  
 124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 125. Larkin, supra note 120. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Thomas F. Gede is of counsel at the firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. He has a distinguished career 
serving in numerous capacities in government, academia, and the private sector in the field of American Indian 
Law.  
 128. Laird, supra note 27. 
 129. See Price, supra note 39, at 700. 
 130. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b) (Supp. I 2013) (emphasis added). 
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doubt as to how Congress intended to frame the power behind SDVCJ, which 
undermines Larkin’s core assumption of delegation. But it remains to be seen 
whether congressional intent is the determinative factor. 
Putting aside for a moment the effect of Congress’s intent in the SDVCJ 
equation, there lies another, more severe obstacle for those who would propose 
an “inherent” basis for tribal jurisdiction under VAWA 2013—the confusion 
apparent in the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding inherent tribal power over 
the last forty years.131 To start with, any view supporting SDVCJ under the 
theory of inherent tribal authority is inconsistent with Oliphant in that the 
Supreme Court refused to recognize any inherent power of tribes to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.132 After all, in Oliphant, Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned in an argument based on historical and political deference 
that “absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress,” there was no 
right for a tribe to try a non-Indian in criminal court.133 But Oliphant did not 
clarify just what “affirmative [congressional] delegation” meant and to what 
extent Congress could exercise such a power. 
The Court’s later decisions in Duro v. Reina134 and United States v. Lara135 
answer some of these questions, but only muddy the water elsewhere. Duro 
followed Oliphant in holding that Indian tribes may not assert criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, reasoning that tribes’ “dependent status” 
to the federal government is inconsistent with the right to freely exert authority 
over external affairs.136 Congress subsequently passed legislation abrogating the 
Court’s holding in Duro (the so-called “Duro fix”), giving criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians back to tribes.137 In the Duro fix, Congress—using 
strikingly similar language to the SDVCJ provisions in VAWA 2013—
“recognized and affirmed” the “inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”138 Some ten years later in Lara, the Court 
upheld the Duro fix, reasoning that Congress had the power to “rela[x] 
restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority that the United States 
recognizes.”139 The majority supported the holding by reasoning that Congress 
simply modified political restrictions placed on tribes’ exercise of inherent 
 
 131. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 41, at 297 (“This pattern of doctrinal confusion has become more 
predominant in recent times because the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself a judicial version of plenary 
power that has muddied the jurisprudential waters of Indian law even further.”). 
 132. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206–12. 
 133. Id. at 208; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 221 (2004) (5–4 decision) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Oliphant . . . held that tribes could not enforce their criminal laws against non-
Indians.”).  
 134. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 135. Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
 136. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686–88. 
 137. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (amended 1991); Act of 
Oct. 28. 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)). 
 138. Price, supra note 39, at 677 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Act of 
Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (amended 1991)). 
 139. Lara, 541 U.S. at 207. 
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power—restrictions that were not in and of themselves constitutionally based.140 
Lastly, and importantly, the majority reasoned that the power recognized to 
tribes in the Duro fix was not “delegated” federal authority as contemplated in 
Duro and Oliphant; rather, Congress achieved the same end by removing 
restrictions on tribal sovereignty.141 
Contrary to the ease with which Justice Breyer reasoned through the 
majority opinion in Lara, the five-four decision and accompanying concurrences 
and dissents leave the Court’s past forty years of federal Indian law 
jurisprudence even less settled.142 As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence made clear, 
the issue before the Court in Lara—the applicability of the “separate sovereign” 
doctrine for defendant’s double jeopardy claim—may have limited the Court’s 
full analysis of the constitutional implications of the Duro fix.143 Indeed, Justice 
Thomas (also concurring in the judgment) called on the Court to “reexamine the 
premises and logic” of the Court’s tribal sovereignty cases.144 Further, the 
dissent by Justice Souter, joined by Justice Scalia, simply refused to accept any 
other basis for expanded tribal authority aside from a delegation of federal 
authority, regardless of how Congress worded the statute.145  
The more recent decision in United States v. Bryant146 is also relevant. In 
Bryant, the Court considered whether an Indian defendant’s uncounseled 
conviction in a tribal court proceeding could serve as a predicate offense for a 
U.S. habitual offender statute.147 The Court unanimously held that since the 
tribal court conviction complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act, it could be 
used as a predicate offense in a U.S. court without violating the defendant’s 
 
 140. Id. at 199–200. 
 141. Id. at 207. 
 142. Price, supra note 39, at 678–79. 
 143. Lara, 541 U.S. at 211–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 144. Id. at 214 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 145. Id. at 227–28 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 146. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
 147. Id. at 1962; The Court described the background of the case as follows:  
  Respondent Bryant’s conduct is illustrative of the domestic violence problem existing in Indian 
country. During the period relevant to this case, Bryant, an enrolled member of the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe, lived on that Tribe’s reservation in Montana. He has a record of over 100 tribal-
court convictions, including several misdemeanor convictions for domestic assault. Specifically, 
between 1997 and 2007, Bryant pleaded guilty on at least five occasions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal 
Court to committing domestic abuse in violation of the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Code. On one 
occasion, Bryant hit his live-in girlfriend on the head with a beer bottle and attempted to strangle her. 
On another, Bryant beat a different girlfriend, kneeing her in the face, breaking her nose, and leaving 
her bruised and bloodied. 
  For most of Bryant’s repeated brutal acts of domestic violence, the Tribal Court sentenced him 
to terms of imprisonment, never exceeding one year. When convicted of these offenses, Bryant was 
indigent and was not appointed counsel. Because of his short prison terms, Bryant acknowledges, the 
prior tribal-court proceedings complied with ICRA, and his convictions were therefore valid when 
entered. Bryant has never challenged his tribal-court convictions in federal court under ICRA’s 
habeas corpus provision. 
Id. at 1963. 
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel.148 The Court’s recognition of the severity of 
the domestic violence problem in Indian country, albeit in dicta, is 
encouraging.149 And the Court’s relatively narrow holding assumed, as Justice 
Thomas asserts in his concurring opinion, “that tribes’ retained sovereignty 
entitles them to prosecute tribal members in proceedings that are not subject to 
the Constitution.”150 But no direct challenge to TLOA (or SDVCJ, for that 
matter) was before the Court, so these premises supporting tribal sovereignty 
may not be persuasive authority in a future case challenging SDVCJ.  
All this is to say that the Court’s more recent Indian law decisions do not 
completely clear up the issue surrounding the constitutionality of SDVCJ. In 
fact, one of the points relied upon by the Lara majority was the “limited” change 
at issue in that case—there, the power to prosecute nonmember Indians.151 
Surely the Court would not view the power to prosecute a non-Indian, U.S. 
citizen as a “limited” change from tribes’ recognized inherent power to 
prosecute their own members—distinguishing SDVCJ from the Duro fix upheld 
in Lara. Not least in the considerations is the scope of Congress’s “plenary 
power” in Indian affairs and the effect of congressional intent to support 
SDVCJ.152 The recent transformation of the makeup of the Supreme Court, with 
the additions of Justice Neil Gorsuch and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, further casts 
uncertainty over the direction of future federal Indian law. While colorable 
arguments can be made on either side of the constitutionality of SDVCJ under 
the Court’s current precedent, Indian victims of non-Indian perpetrated domestic 
violence need concrete solutions.153  
Fortunately, uncertainty in current law is not the end of the analysis. 
Professor Zachary Price154 in his article, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and 
Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, presents a compelling case for a pragmatic 
resolution to the problems encountered in defining the boundaries and sources 
of constitutional tribal jurisdiction.155 Professor Price argues that, while the 
 
 148. Id. at 1966. 
 149. See id. at 1963 (noting that the Respondent’s conduct is “illustrative of the domestic violence problem” 
in Indian country). 
 150. Id. at 1967–69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling again for a reexamination of the Court’s Indian law 
precedent).  
 151. Lara, 541 U.S. at 204. 
 152. For further discussion on the plenary power doctrine and its effect on SDVCJ, see Margaret H. Zhang, 
Comment, Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty 
Versus Defendants’ Complete Constitutional Rights, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 274–76 (2015); cf. Lara, 541 U.S. 
at 224–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the constitutional basis for the congressional 
Indian plenary power doctrine). 
 153. For an argument urging the constitutionality of SDVCJ under the majority opinion in Lara, see M. 
Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant, Lara, and DOJ’s Proposed Fix, 28 HARV. 
J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 117, 171 (2012); cf Larkin, supra note 119 (arguing that section 904 of VAWA, 
which grants Indian tribal courts concurrent jurisdiction, is unconstitutional and “should be struck down”). 
 154. Professor Zachary Price is an Associate Professor at the University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law, where he specializes in constitutional law, civil procedure, and federal Indian law, among other areas.  
 155. See generally Price, supra note 39 (proposing a framework based on “divided sovereignty” and the 
parallels between tribal, territorial, and related federal-state contexts). 
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“inherent” versus “delegated” framework adopted by various courts and scholars 
is conceptually appealing, it suffers from fatal doctrinal problems that may 
eventually undercut the core goals of tribal sovereignty.156 For instance, in the 
context of state-conducted Public Law 280 prosecutions, a consistent application 
of case law under the “inherent” authority doctrine might lead such prosecutions 
to be “shoehorned into the inherent authority framework by characterizing such 
prosecutions as exercises of a reactivated inherent authority of states over their 
territory.”157 This has potentially damning consequences to the tribes that gained 
so much with the passage of VAWA 2013 by further detracting from the tribal 
sovereignty remaining over Indian lands. Further, the same “inherent” versus 
“delegated” framework has consistently led the Supreme Court to progressively 
curtail what little has remained of tribal sovereignty in the last forty years.158 
Professor Price presents his conceptual alternative by “[r]ecognizing the 
interplay of federal and local authority at work in tribal . . . criminal 
jurisdiction,” and analyzing constitutional issues based on comparisons between 
tribal, territorial, and state contexts.159 In his view, normative considerations and 
practical realities can lead to a constitutionally permissible interpretive 
framework of “divided sovereignty,” where many of the conceptually 
problematic aspects of inherent authority disappear.160 Instead of focusing 
primarily on the source of power being exercised—that is, whether a power is 
inherent in a subordinate government or delegated from the superior 
government—the relevant focus shifts to the divisions of power characteristic 
within our federal system.161 
By adopting Professor Price’s framework, the Article II and III issues 
raised by Larkin essentially disappear, recognizing that the crimes of domestic 
violence prosecuted by tribes pursuant to SDVCJ are federally conferred, but 
realized through the autonomous powers of criminal enforcement in tribal 
governments.162 Tribal courts simply enforce and punish local prohibitions 
against criminal domestic violence. Such a conclusion has long since been 
implicitly acknowledged by a large body of case law.163 This division of 
sovereignty between tribes and the federal government places SDVCJ 
prosecution in a separate realm from the typical structural restraints present 
within the federal government. Since additional practical reasons for federal 
 
 156. Id. at 663–64; cf. Zhang, supra note 152, at 263–72 (analyzing SDVCJ’s constitutionality through a 
binary application of “inherent” versus “delegated” authority). 
 157. Price, supra note 39, at 697; see also id. at 692–95. 
 158. Id. at 697–98. 
 159. Id. at 698; see also id. at 668. 
 160. Id. at 698. Professor Price notes his article comes from the perspective of “a federal decisionmaker 
bound to apply federal law and to seek coherent solutions within the existing legal system.” Id. at 667. 
 161. See id. at 699–726. 
 162. See id. at 698–99. This thesis bears some recognition to the typical inherent/delegated framework but 
places the emphasis in a somewhat different place. It instead views the powers of federal and tribal sovereignty 
as coexistent and intertwined. In places of shared sovereignty, federal individual rights may well bend to 
compelling tribal interests such as regulating pervasive criminal activity. 
 163. Id. 
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control are absent (particularly where defendants’ procedural protections are 
mandated, like in VAWA 2013), any remaining argument that a tribal judge 
should qualify as an “Officer of the United States” falls apart, and no Article II 
appointment issues or Article III life tenure or salary guarantee issues remain.164 
This Note further considers this framework in conjunction with SDVCJ 
expansion infra Part III.  
2.  Other Critiques 
Professor Riley discusses a paradox at the very core of SDVCJ. She 
elevates the concern that “Indian tribes may only be able to guarantee their 
sovereign rights to exercise criminal jurisdiction if they do so on the terms of 
the very government that has, for so long, sought to dismantle tribal justice 
systems.”165 She refers to this as the “double blind” of the tribal sovereignty 
SDVCJ embodies.166 In a sense, tribes are left with the choice of using penal 
methods that likely do not conform to their history and traditions, or watching 
their people suffer because they have no effective authority without imitating an 
American criminal justice system.167 While the tribes that have implemented 
SDVCJ appear to be operating under a familiar American-like adversarial 
system, tribes and tribal leaders have repeatedly expressed the desire to use 
alternatives to detention when feasible.168 Such alternative approaches are 
decidedly more consistent with tribal law and custom.169 
Tribes have historically expressed skepticism around various procedural features 
of the American criminal justice system. Throughout Indian country, disputes are 
resolved in justice systems of many varieties, some of which may significantly 
deviate from American-style courts. Tribes may resolve disputes through 
informal mechanisms, such as families, clans, talking circles, or elder councils. 
Tribal leaders have in the past opposed the idea of jury trials, the encouragement 
of defendants not to speak as to their own guilt or innocence, and an impartial 
judge with no knowledge of the case, among others. Tribes may, therefore, elect 
to integrate traditional practices at all stages of the criminal justice process.170 
For example, systems like those of the Yurok Tribe in Northern California 
have seen strong signs of success in rehabilitating batterers in recent years.171 
Judge Abby Abinanti, Chief Judge of the Yurok Tribal Court, has placed an 
emphasis on developing methods that align with tribal custom prior to Western 
interruption, incorporating the elder system to intervene and prevent future 
 
 164. See id. at 699–703. 
 165. Riley, supra note 12, at 1595. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. at 1624–25. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 1627 (footnotes omitted). 
 171. Rebecca Clarren, Judge Abby Abinanti Is Fighting for Her Tribe—and for a Better Justice System, 
NATION (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/judge-abby-abinanti-is-fighting-for-her-tribe-and-
for-a-better-justice-system/. 
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violence.172 In many ways, tribes are in a unique position to implement effective 
alternatives to incarceration that are tailored to the needs of a much smaller 
population than most American jurisdictions oversee.173  
Once again, in order to exercise SDVCJ, a tribe must provide defendants 
with additional procedural protections and Western judicial infrastructure that 
are not otherwise mandatory. As these examples have demonstrated, doing so is 
often directly contrary to tribal tradition and custom.174 The more ideal goal, 
according to Professor Riley, is to seek a cultural match between tribal values 
and contemporary governance.175 Professor Riley ultimately concludes that 
adoption of SDVCJ, when appropriate and fiscally possible, presents “an 
opportunity for tribal governments to exercise, enhance, and enrich tribal 
sovereignty.”176 
Other commentators have pushed the view that, despite VAWA 2013’s 
success, SDVCJ does not go nearly far enough. Some push for an expansion of 
tribal jurisdiction over collateral crimes to domestic violence.177 Others push for 
more expansive jurisdiction into crimes such as acquaintance rape, stranger rape, 
and all child sexual crimes—crimes which are not covered by SDVCJ.178 Several 
recent developments in the 115th Congress show significant promise on these 
fronts.179  
Senate Bill 1986, titled Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Violence, 
would amend the SDVCJ section of Indian Civil Rights Act (added in VAWA 
2013) to also include tribal jurisdiction over crimes of sexual violence, sex 
trafficking, and stalking.180 This provision relies on the same constitutional 
framework as the Duro fix and SDVCJ, affirming “inherent” tribal authority to 
exercise jurisdiction over such acts.181 Another bill, Savanna’s Act, directs the 
United States Attorney General to address and coordinate solutions in response 
to the epidemic of missing and murdered indigenous women.182 Two other bills 
would aid funding gaps in Indian country both to survivors of violence and tribal 
law enforcement services.183 One of the most recent bills, the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act of 2018, combines many of these elements and may 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. (“The tribe has yet to analyze its recidivism rates overall, but a handful of studies indicate that 
other tribal courts are achieving better success for their members than are state courts.”). 
 174. Riley, supra note 12, at 1599. 
 175. Id. at 1628. 
 176. Id. at 1574. 
 177. Quilt et al., supra note 29. 
 178. See, e.g., DEER, supra note 71, at 105–06.  
 179. See Lillian Alvernaz, Still Not Enough, MS. JD BLOG (Feb. 15, 2018), https://ms-
jd.org/blog/article/still-not-enough. 
 180. Justice for Native Survivors of Sexual Violence Act, S. 1986, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). 
 181. See id. 
 182. Savanna’s Act, S. 1942, 115th Cong. §§ 1–2 (2017); Savanna’s Act, H.R. 4485, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 183. See SURVIVE Act, S. 1870, 115th Cong. (2017); Tribal Law and Order Reauthorization and 
Amendments Act of 2017, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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well form the basis for the eventual legislation.184 The new legislation may 
transform SDVCJ to the new “special tribal criminal jurisdiction,” which covers 
the areas mentioned above along with crimes of child abuse.185 Regarding the 
fate of these bills, any challenge to the constitutionality of SDVCJ will have 
critical implications for the bills’ potential passage, as the constitutional 
authority for criminal jurisdiction in each bill is shared with VAWA 2013. 
III.  PATHS FORWARD 
This Part attempts to offer a solution focused on how SDVCJ can be 
improved to best serve Native American victims of domestic violence that occur 
on tribal lands. Effective law enforcement and penal authority on tribal 
communities would serve the dual functions of holding offenders accountable 
and garnering confidence of tribal communities in their power to respond to 
domestic violence. Domestic violence continues to be an issue of epidemic 
proportions despite the enactment of VAWA 2013. Domestic violence still 
occurs at an unacceptably high rate in Indian communities—five times more 
often than in white communities—and far too often by non-Indian 
perpetrators.186  
Drawing from the lessons learned through a close examination of the 
history, implementation, and early successes of SDVCJ, this Part advocates for 
a legislative expansion tailored to those tribes that cannot feasibly implement 
the requirements needed to exercise SDVCJ.187 Defendants’ rights must be 
protected, but tribal governments should not be powerless to protect their people 
when the federal government will not act effectively. The safety and well-being 
of indigenous women depends on a viable solution. 
A.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: AN “SDVCJ FIX” 
In the five years since the passage of VAWA 2013, only eighteen known 
tribes have been able to implement SDVCJ.188 Indeed, one of the primary 
reasons, if not the primary reason, why SDVCJ has not been more broadly 
implemented is the lack of resources of prospective tribes.189 The Pascua Yaqui 
Tribe described some of the concerns that face tribes looking to employ SDVCJ 
as follows:  
In addition to the direct costs of complying with the prerequisites (indigent 
defender systems, jury trials, incarceration, etc.), substantial indirect costs are 
 
 184. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2018, H.R. 6545, 115th Cong. § 906 (2018). 
 185. Id. § 906. 
 186. FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 3. 
 187. Tribes that can feasibly implement the jurisdiction as laid out in VAWA 2013 should still be able to 
where desirable in the tribe’s own circumstances. In some cases, tribes may wish to adopt this new proposed 
format regardless of financial considerations. Given the jurisdictional arguments advanced herein, tribes should 
be able to determine for themselves which type of jurisdiction is most beneficial, the basis for tribal sovereignty 
being the same in either circumstance.  
 188. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 1. 
 189. Id. at 29. 
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also likely to be required. For example, who will review and propose changes to 
your laws and procedures? Who will train law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, 
court staff and defense counsel on the new laws and procedures and how they 
work? What funding will be required to make these changes? To pay for any 
additional prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, and court staff? To pay to publish 
the laws and regulations? To process the licensing and educational requirements? 
To implement the jury selection process? To pay for incarceration? Where will 
these funds come from? Is that source of funding stable and reliable?190 
By passing VAWA 2013 and failing to appropriate the funds necessary to 
allow it to be effective in Indian country over the first years of the program, 
Congress has effectively acknowledged the problem in Indian country and 
walked away without committing to solve it. It is time to take an alternate path 
that can work for all victims of inter-racial tribal domestic violence. 
As a starting point, scholars and practitioners have advocated for 
encouraging alternatives to incarceration outside SDVCJ, which are consistent 
with many tribal traditions and cultures.191 Such dispute resolution procedures 
have firm roots in many tribes’ history. When practical, as Professor Riley has 
noted, employing such procedures can have a positive effect for tribal 
sovereignty and determination, as well as on survivors and offenders.192 On 
another important note, many of the additional procedural burdens imposed by 
tribes exercising SDVCJ are only operative when a period of imprisonment is 
contemplated.193 If a tribe “exercises” SDVCJ without imposing imprisonment 
on a defendant, the tribe need only provide the right to a jury trial and the right 
to “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the 
United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power 
of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.”194 Of course, it is not a stretch to imagine a lack 
of meaningful incentive for offenders to participate when absolutely no period 
of imprisonment—even detention—is possible unless the tribe complies with 
the procedural requirements of SDVCJ. While traditional tribal dispute methods 
can provide meaningful solutions in many cases, in the context of domestic 
violence they may not be as effective. Victims simply would not be afforded the 
necessary protection and safety they need when tribal governments do not have 
concrete legal justification to detain abusers in emergency situations. This is the 
place where an expanded tribal authority can meet a need. I propose the 
following solution, an “SDVCJ fix.”  
As a viable SDVCJ fix, this Note proposes an amendment to VAWA and 
TLOA that would dramatically increase the number of tribes eligible to exercise 
 
 190. Id. (quoting ALFRED URBINA & MELISSA TATUM, CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING VAWA’S 
SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND TLOA’S ENHANCED SENTENCING AUTHORITY: A 
LOOK AT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PASCUA TRIBE 41 (2014)). 
 191. See Riley, supra note 12, at 1620–22; ROADMAP, supra note 79, at 129. 
 192. See Riley, supra note 12, at 1625 n.308. 
 193. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (Supp. I 2013) (referencing procedural rights required by TLOA for terms of 
imprisonment longer than one year). 
 194. See id. 
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SDVCJ. Specifically, Congress should amend VAWA 2013 to allow tribes to 
criminally prosecute and imprison non-Indian defendants who commit crimes of 
domestic violence against tribal members, have sufficient ties to the victim, and 
do not successfully complete tribal programs offered to the defendant as an 
alternative to incarceration. This power would be afforded to all tribes, not 
simply those with the means to implement a Western court system. Such 
authority would include the power for tribal law enforcement to intervene at the 
point of conflict and detain defendants for a time commensurate with the crime 
they are suspected of committing. Any subsequent period of a defendant’s 
imprisonment would not be subject to the same procedural requirements of 
SDVCJ, but instead would be determined by balancing the interests of tribes and 
defendants. 
This proposal takes the current Congress as it has appeared through much 
of the 2010s—gridlocked, partisan, and eager to save resources. Thus, it assumes 
that Congress will not change the law to eliminate the prohibitively expensive 
procedural requirements of TLOA and VAWA 2013. It also assumes that 
Congress will not meaningfully fund the 573 federally recognized tribes who 
have not been able to implement SDVCJ to bring themselves into compliance 
with the procedural requirements of exercising the law.  
While wider sweeping proposals might more effectively fix the SDVCJ 
problem, this Note offers a more nuanced solution. It attempts to strike a balance 
between the politically possible and the idealistic, all while striving to offer a 
viable solution to the victims who have not been afforded protection under 
SDVCJ. This proposal also attempts to strike a balance between protecting 
victims from abuse and protecting non-Indian defendants’ rights. By potentially 
offsetting or delaying any period of imprisonment (aside from intervention in 
the act of a crime), defendants’ interests in procedural protections may well be 
reduced in initial proceedings under this framework.  
Professor Price’s “divided sovereignty” approach, as previously discussed, 
attempted to propose an adequate and supportable doctrinal framework for 
addressing constitutional issues in tribal sovereignty. This Note proposes 
adopting that framework and uses it as a justification for this proposed SDVCJ 
fix.195 This framework simultaneously clears a quagmire of constitutional 
reasoning and provides support for this Note’s proposed SDVCJ fix. Professor 
 
 195. Before moving on, it is worth recalling the “inherent” versus “delegated” approach to tribal 
sovereignty. Under a pure version of that framework, there would be no procedural requirements for tribes 
exercising an undiluted “inherent” criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, absent congressional mandate of tribes 
under the ‘plenary power’ doctrine. While such a reading would certainly make the SDVCJ fix analysis simple, 
there simply is no guarantee that the current Supreme Court would uphold SDVCJ under that framework. But 
on the other hand, an adoption of that doctrine with an assumption of “delegated” tribal authority would be 
devastating to tribal sovereignty and those who seek to remedy the epidemic of domestic violence on tribal lands. 
From a “delegated” standpoint, there could be absolutely no exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction without a full 
accompaniment of procedural and structural rights, rendering both SDVCJ and this Note’s proposed SDVCJ fix 
dead in the water. 
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Price’s framework196 drew from analogous circumstances of federal-state 
relations.197 There, he found support in a balancing framework to determine 
which guarantees of the U.S. Constitution apply in a given circumstance.198 To 
the extent a court would accept such a balancing framework, the “autonomy 
interests of the tribe might support allowing prosecution in accordance with 
traditional procedures of the particular prosecuting tribe, but only insofar as the 
accommodation of the tribe’s procedural tradition does not unduly burden the 
individual interests underlying an asserted procedural right.”199 It is in this area 
that the critical last step—imprisonment—of the proposed SDVCJ fix would 
find itself.  
To be clear, Congress would be making a significant exception to the 
Indian Civil Rights Act by eliminating certain tribal defendants’ procedural 
rights under the scenario envisioned in this proposed SDVCJ fix. Under current 
precedent, Congress has the nearly universally accepted right to legislate 
limitations on tribal sovereignty such as requiring process in tribal courts.200 But 
under this Note’s proposal, defendants could only be deprived of constitutional 
due process with compelling justification by any tribe exercising the proposed 
SDVCJ fix. And, as tribes have routinely demonstrated throughout the first five 
years of SDVCJ implementation, fairness is, and has always been, the goal of 
tribal adjudication.201 The proceedings of different tribes will certainly vary in 
the degree to which they resemble Western adjudication, but through an 
application of tribal customary norms, tribes can simultaneously exercise and 
realize sovereignty and reach more tribally appropriate results.202 The example 
set by Judge Abby Abinanti of the Yurok Tribal Court could become the norm 
in exercising this new jurisdiction: issuing a restraining order as an initial matter 
and moving immediately to offer a batterer entry into a tribally run rehabilitation 
program.203 In such an example, should the batterer fail to complete the program 
and recidivate, the tribal court would have the power to imprison the defendant 
under its natural proceedings with only those facets of due process absent that 
the tribe could not provide. These proceedings would likely take a wide range 
of forms, the diversity of tribal values and custom being so diverse across the 
nation.204 Skeptics of this proposal should recognize that, as in Western courts, 
truth-finding is a paramount concern across tribal courts.205 The same holds true 
 
 196. For the full analysis of the divided sovereignty doctrine, see Price, supra note 39. 
 197. Id. at 709–10. 
 198. Id. at 723. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 722. 
 201. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 18–21.  
 202. See April L. Wilkinson, A Framework for Understanding Tribal Courts and the Application of 
Fundamental Law: Through the Voices of Scholars in the Field of Tribal Justice, 15 TRIBAL L.J. 67, 67–68 
(2015). 
 203. See Clarren, supra note 171. 
 204. Wilkinson, supra note 202, at 82. 
 205. See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the 
Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49, 62 (1988). 
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for reconciliation and healing, which perhaps receives greater focus in tribal 
courts than in our Western courts.206  
Uncertainties will undoubtedly arise under an early implementation of such 
a plan, but it is encouraging to note that the ITWG is already in place and would 
be the go-to source for collaboration in an early implementation of such a 
plan.207 The federal government could provide funding for attorneys to aid in 
early interpretive issues surrounding procedural issues in the new law with 
relatively little expense. 
The proposed SDVCJ fix would also encourage tribe-specific interventions 
and conflict resolution strategies, made more effective by the threat of 
imprisonment in the event of non-compliance with such programs. The last 
critical component would allow tribal police to intervene at the point of the crime 
and detain defendants, rather than only being able to remove defendants from 
reservations as in current non-SDVCJ implementing tribes.208 This is a critical 
step in preventing further victimization. Before any determination of guilt has 
been made, tribal courts could issue orders of protection to aid in the 
peacekeeping process before the adjudicative proceeding, as in the current 
SDVCJ framework. 
This Part has attempted to lay out a constitutionally permissible solution to 
the problem facing the hundreds of tribes who cannot feasibly implement the 
requirements to prosecute non-Indian offenders who commit crimes of domestic 
violence on their tribal lands. If adopted, this would enable a significantly higher 
number of tribes to protect their own and retake some of the sovereignty lost 
under Oliphant.  
CONCLUSION 
The crisis in Indian country has gone on for far too long, abetted by the 
United States’ failure to sufficiently address the issue it recognized in passing 
VAWA 2013. Domestic violence has continued to be a problem, rising to 
epidemic proportions before VAWA 2013 and continuing at unacceptably high 
rates. While the Act heralded significant progress, it does not go far enough. If 
we continue at the current rate, there simply is not another option besides 
extraordinary spending increases, which seem unlikely to happen. The tribes 
need funding, not just to implement the laws, but to police non-Indian crimes, 
report the incidents, and ensure their people are properly protected and cared for 
when they are harmed. The United States now has a choice: either dramatically 
increase funding to tribes under SDVCJ or lighten the procedural process tribes 
must provide non-Indian defendants accused of crimes of domestic violence. 
 
 206. See Riley, supra note 12, at 1624–28. 
 207. See FIVE-YEAR REPORT, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
 208. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c) (Supp. I 2013); Kevin Abourezk, Tribes Confront Unique Problems in Battle 
Against Domestic Violence, INDIANZ (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/04/10/tribes-
confront-unique-problems-in-battl.asp.  
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One of the foundational principles of federal-Indian law jurisprudence is 
the “trust relationship” the U.S. government owes to Indian peoples.209 The stark 
reality of domestic violence and jurisdiction in Indian country demands that the 
United States adapt to uphold its end of the bargain. As argued in this Note, 
victims do not have the luxury to be held at the mercy of a federal government 
who cannot or will not adequately protect their well-being. As an alternative to 
the current trajectory, this Note proposes a path to increased tribal authority for 
those tribes that do not have the means to implement the judicial infrastructure 
required to prosecute non-Indians via SDVCJ. This proposed “SDVCJ fix” has 
the potential to simultaneously increase exhibition of tribal sovereignty, 
provided Congress acts to release some of the restrictions on procedure in 
limited circumstances. But more importantly, an SDVCJ fix would provide a 
respite for tribal victims of domestic violence who for too long have suffered at 
the hands of batterers enabled by the laws of the United States. Working together 
is the ultimate solution. It is time the United States acted on its trust 
responsibility and allow tribes the means to adequately protect women. 
  
 
 209. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 37, at 71–72; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 
(1831). 
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